Abstract-Multicast enables efficient large-scale content distribution and has become more and more popular in network service. Security is a critical issue for multicast because many applications require access control and privacy. This issue is more sensitive to wireless network, which is lack of physical boundaries. IEEE 802.16 is the standard for next generation wireless network, which aims to provide the last mile access for Wireless Metropolitan Area Network (WirelessMAN). Multicast is also supported in IEEE 802.16, and a Multicast and Broadcast Rekeying Algorithm (MBRA) was proposed in the standard as an optional function for secure multicast. However, this algorithm does not provide backward and forward secrecy. It is not scalable to a large group either. This paper reviews the above two deficiencies of MBRA and proposes revision to address these problems for Intra-BS multicast. We also propose algorithms for secure multicast in different scenarios of WirelessMAN besides its basic schema, including Inter-BS multicast, multicast for mesh network, and multicast during handover.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless networks have become more and more pervasive due to their many advantages. The IEEE 802.16 standard [1] , which is also known as WirelessMAN (Wireless Metropolitan Area Networks), aims to provide broadband wireless access (BWA) for the last mile of network access. The recently released IEEE 802.16e [2] adds mobility features and some other functions including multicast. WiMAX (Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access) is the forum organized by the industry to certify products related to IEEE 802. 16 . We focus on WiMAX in this paper instead of WirelessMAN or IEEE 802. 16 , because some scenarios we consider here relate to functionalities suggested in the WiMAX forum that are not included in IEEE 802.16 standard. Multicast in WiMAX is a promising service, suitable for many applications, such as stock option bidding, pay per view TV broadcasting, video conferencing, etc., for both fixed and mobile subscribers.
Those emerging applications usually depend on secure group communications, which require privacy for participants and access control at the multicast server. On the other hand, scalability is another critical concern for the multicast service underlying these applications due to the possible large number of group members. In the domain of wired networks, efficient and secure multicast is a widely studied problem and several popular protocols have been proposed. This is not necessarily true for the domain of wireless networks, where attention has been less significant.
The challenge of a secure multicast service, such as the one included in IEEE 802. 16 , is to provide an efficient method for controlling access to the group and its communications. Encryption of group messages and selective distribution of the keys used for encryption is the primary method for ensuring the security. For a dynamic group in which the membership changes frequently, the rekeying algorithm is a critical factor in overall service efficiency. This algorithm should guarantee forward secrecy, which prevents a leaving member from accessing future communications; and backward secrecy, which prevents a joining member from accessing former communications. On the other hand, a rekeying algorithm should be efficient as well. That means it should be scalable to a large group and exhibit good performance during key distribution, which is usually measured by communication/computation complexity, server storage complexity, and user storage complexity.
This paper reviews the Privacy and Key Management (PKM) protocol (with respect to the multicast setting) and proposes secure multicast protocols for various scenarios in WiMAX. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, related work on both IEEE 802.16 protocols and on secure multicast protocols are introduced. In Section III, the weaknesses of Multicast and Broadcast Rekeying Algorithm (MBRA) in IEEE 802.16e are detailed and more efficient and secure modifications are brought up. MBRA is in fact for intra-BS multicast only. In Section IV, we analyze some currently available rekeying algorithms and propose Adaptive Inter-BS Multicast Protocol, which addresses both security and effiency for Inter-BS multicast. Similar protocols are selected to compare with our protocol and their weaknesses are also addressed. We also apply some efficient rekeying algorithms for mesh network in Section V. In Section VI, we propose a family of rekeying algorithms for multicast during the handover from one base station (BS) to another. Finally, we conclude in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Since the first version of the IEEE 802.16 standard [3] was released in 2002, many articles and books have been published that elaborate the standard at the details. In [4] , the chair of the standard committee gave a technical overview of IEEE 802. 16 , which was extended later as [5] . Some 802.16 group members also publish a book [6] in 2006, which provided a detailed overview of the standard and explained the rationale behind development decisions. The authors of [7] reviewed the standard, analyze the security provided by the standard, and discussed the requirement of mutual authentication between the Subscriber Station (SS) and the Base Station (BS). In [8] the PKM protocol is discussed in detail, and more attacks on various versions of PKM protocols listed in [3] and [7] are discovered. Revisions of PKM protocols are also proposed to prevent those attacks. In [9] , another attack on PKM version 2 (PKMv2) is detailed. However, none of these publications cover the MBRA version released in early 2006 [2] .
There is a report [10] that analyzes the IEEE 802.16 MBRA. That report focuses on replay attacks against the MBRA 1 , similar to the attacks listed in [7] and [8] . However, it does not cover the backward and forward secrecy afforded to communications before/after rekeying, or the efficiency of the MBRA, both of which are paramount to a desirable, secure rekeying algorithm.
More generally, secure multicast has been a popular topic in the past ten years, and many protocols have been proposed. Ref. [11] , [12] , [13] , and [14] are the first few works dealing with secure multicast, in which straightforward, yet not scalable methods, are described. The Iolus approach detailed in [15] is a distributed method in which a hierarchy of agents is used as subgroup controllers. Using Iolus, scalability is ensured because member changes in one subgroup do not affect other subgroups. It also provides other promising features such as fault-tolerance. Kronos [16] takes a unique periodical rekeying approach that rekeys the group only at specified time intervals. Customary rekeying upon member changes are delayed until the next rekeying interval, therefore the number of rekeying operation is reduced.
Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) tree algorithms are proposed in [17] and [18] , which provide O(log n) communication complexity, where n is the number of group members. There are three schemes in the VersaKey framework [19] , one of which is a centralized tree-based management scheme. It applies a one-way function to update a key tree upon members joining, and thus is also referred to as LHK+. One-way Function Tree is proposed in [20] , which reduces half of the rekeying messages when comparing to LKH. A similar scheme is One-way Function Chain Tree [21] . Adaptive Rekeying scheme is proposed in [22] , which can employ different level of complementary keys according to application requirements.
In this paper, different solutions are proposed according to various scenarios of IEEE 802.16 multicast. Some popular rekeying algorithms are directly applied for Intra-BS multicast and mesh network. Some novel schemes are proposed for handover and Inter-BS multicast. Our Adaptive Inter-BS Multicast Protocol integrates the advantages of the approaches presented in [14] , [15] and [22] to achieve better efficiency. Some of the algorithms have been published in our previous paper [23] . In addition to that paper, we compare several similar protocols to our Adaptive Inter-BS mulitcast protocol. Their weaknesses are addressed and several attacks are found, which break backward and forward secrecy. Multicast for mesh network is also discussed. Moreover, we propose a family of rekeying algorithms for different scenarios of handover procedure, besides the Delayed Feedback Rekeying Algorithm for basic handover situation in [23] . First, the PKM protocol provides secure distribution of keying material from a BS to an SS. Second, the protocol enables a BS to enforce access control over network services. A brief summary of a PKM protocol that runs between an SS and a BS is described as follows. The SS initiates the protocol and first authenticates with a BS (PKMv2 also provides mutual authentication), establishing a shared secret-an Authentication Key (AK). The BS will also send a Secure Association Identifier (SAID) list that the SS is entitled to access, which indicates explicitly the services authorized to the SS. Then using a Key Request message from SS to BS and Key Reply message from BS to SS, the SS receives the keying material corresponding to a specified SAID.
III. INTRA-BS MULITICAST
The Multicast and Broadcast Service in IEEE 802.16 is an efficient and power saving mechanism, which also provides subscribers with strong protection from theft of service by encrypting broadcast connections between an SS and BS. MBRA is used to refresh traffic keying material for the multicast service of IEEE 802. 16 This message contains the new GKEK encrypted with the Key Encryption Key (KEK), which is derived from the AK established during authentication. Then, the BS transmits the Key Update Command message for GTEK update mode through the Broadcast Connection, which contains the new GTEK encrypted with the corresponding GKEK. The protocol can be specified as Fig. 1 .
B. Analysis of MBRA
There are two problems with this protocol. First, this protocol is not scalable as the BS still needs to unicast individual messages to each SS. Second, it does not address the issue of backward and forward secrecy. In the case of member joining, when a new member receives the current GTEK by Key Request and Key Reply messages, it can decrypt all previous data that were multicast during the lifetime of the same GTEK. In the case of member leaving, there is nothing in this protocol that prevents the leaving SS from receiving the future traffic encrypted by the current GTEK which it possesses.
In fact, this algorithm is similar with the Group Key Management Protocol (GKMP) in [12] and [13] , which does not provide solution for keeping the forward secrecy except creating an entirely new group without the leaving member. This scheme is thus inherently not scalable to large dynamic group. By sending the GKEK to each SS intermittently, it reduces the BS's load in refreshing traffic key material, but the overall computation of BS and communication messages remain the same, which is linear to group size.
There is no specification about the lifetime of GKEK in [2] . However, the recommendation in IEEE 802.16 [24] , which originally proposes the MBRA, states that the lifetime of GKEK should be the same as GTEK. On page 313, the standard [2] also states that BS shall distribute updated traffic keying material by sending two Key Update Command messages before old GTEK is expired. In fact, both of the two messages are necessary in order to provide backward/forward secrecy upon member changes. In this case, the usage of GKEK is not necessary at all. We modify MBRA as follows with only the usage of GTEK, as Fig. 2 .
By sending GTEK to SS intermittently, our modified scheme still keeps the benefit of reducing the BS's load for key refreshment. However, we only need to send an update notice in plaintext (with BS's signature if message authentication is necessary, which may also be required in MBRA), thus saving both BS and SS encryption/decryption as well as key storage.
There is some ambiguity in the MBRA of [2] . On page 315, opposite to the description on page 313, it states that the BS should distribute an updated GTEK by using two messages when the GKEK has been changed, or by using one (the second) message otherwise. In this case, the lifetime of GKEK should be several times longer than that of GTEK in order to encrypt and distribute more than one GTEK. This kind of rekeying should take place only due to expiration of GTEK. Our modified scheme still gives better performance in this case. The BS should add the key index (0 if the GTEK is first distributed by Message 1) in the update notice by Message 2, and each group member only needs to update the session key by certain one-way hash function. Meanwhile, the security of group multicast will not be hurt in our modified scheme comparing to MBRA. That is because the omitted GKEK does not provide group control at all by sending Message 2 alone; it is only used to broadcast the GTEK to current group members. That means, this scheme does not provide backward and forward secrecy at all. Considering there are some members joining and leaving while GKEK does not change. In this situation, the joining members could use this GKEK to decrypt previous key update messages and get the old GTEK. On the other hand, the leaving members could use this GKEK to decrypt current or future key update messages and get the new GTEK. Therefore, unlike our revised algorithm, the original MBRA in this case is not suitable for rekeying upon membership changes.
In summary, our modified scheme works as follows: If GTEK is first distributed by Key-Update-Command messages (including rekeying when a member leaves), both Message 1 and Message 2 need to be sent, and the key index in Message 2 is set to 0. If rekeying happens when a member joins, only Message 2 needs to be sent, with one greater index than previous one, each group member will update the GTEK according to the index using agreed one-way hash function; meanwhile, BS sends this updated GTEK to the new member by unicast (through Primary Management Connection encrypted by KEK). If rekeying occurs due to session key expiring, only Message 2 needs to broadcast, with one greater index to notify group members to update the GTEK by agreed one-way hash function.
We can further improve our scheme by removing message 2, as shown in figure 3 . After sending new GTEK to each SS intermittently, the BS and SSes just update to using new GTEK after some pre-defined interval. The improved scheme has the same effect as previous scheme but with fewer messages exchanged. For the normal procedure, they have the same effect on key update; for abnormal case, in which some SS may not receive new GTEK, Key Request and Key Reply messages are necessary exchanged between this SS and BS. That is 1) Message 1. BS → SSes : KEK(GT EK) Figure 3 . Improved MBRA for Intra-BS Multicast because the SS does not reply with confirmation message to BS, the BS has no way to know whether the SS has received the new GTEK or not. Unless after timeout, the SS will send Key Request message. But this make no difference between BS sending update notice message (message 2) to SSes and each SS updating automatically.
The authors of [25] bring up the chaining problem which exists in its previous proposal [24] . In [24] , the authors use the old GTEK to encrypt the new GTEK upon update. Thus they claim, if an SS knowing the current GTEK attempts to delete the specific service (in fact, the member leave case), that SS can continuously decode the newly updated GTEK and be served with multicast service. Therefore, they propose to use GKEK to encrypt the new GTEK. It seems our modified scheme has the same problem also. However, we handle the above case as rekeying when a member leaves, in which both Message 1 and Message 2 need to be sent, thus guarantees the backward secrecy to the multicast group. On the other hand, in MBRA of [2] , if only Message 2 is sent in this situation as they proposed, the using of GKEK will not provide any more security, because the leaving SS knows not only the old GTEK, but also the GKEK, thus the SS is still able to decrypt the new GTEK and get the multicast service.
In fact, the lifetime of TEK is 30 minutes minimum, 12 hours by default, and 7 days maximum. Such a long time can not guarantee the security of traffic in a group with frequent member changes. If the lifetime of GTEK can be set short enough, the periodical rekeying scheme is still a possible solution for secure intra-BS multicast, such as Kronos [16] .
Logic Hierarchy Key Tree management protocols, such as [17] , [20] , [21] , and [22] , are also possible choices for Intra-BS multicast. This kind of scheme mitigates the work load of BS (O(log n) compared to O(n) in the basic scheme), thus is scalable to large group. The tradeoff is that the SSes have to store and encrypt/decrypt more keys (O(log n) compared to O(1) in the basic scheme).
IV. ADAPTIVE INTER-BS MULTICAST PROTOCOL
IEEE 802.16 does not provide key management schema for Inter-BS multicast, possibly because exchanging messages among BSes (through the backhaul) is beyond the scope of the standard, or this management is intended to be left for protocols in higher layers. However, the key distribution of high layer protocol may require different key encryption schema, which will result in redundant work for both BSes and SSes. Besides, the group management, such as member authentication, still requires the BS to communicate with the group manager or AAA (Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting) servers on backbone. Moreover, the handover procedure also needs the cooperation among BSes. Designing an Inter-BS Protocol will serve these functions, similar to the Inter-AP (Access Point) Protocol for IEEE 802.11, which is in fact a recommendation known as IEEE 802.11F. Keeping key management and encryption within the MAC layer can also provide better performance.
A. Some Currently Available Algorithms
Without changing the Intra-BS multicast protocols, the Iolus [15] could be used for Inter-BS multicast. Iolus belongs to the type of cluster scheme, using a secure distribution tree (SDT) composed of a number of smaller secure multicast subgroups. The group manager (Group Security Controller -GSC in [15] ) manages the toplevel subgroup and the cluster headers (Group Security Intermediaries -GSI in [15] and the BS in IEEE 802.16) manage each of the other subgroups. Each GSI just relays the traffic from its parent in SDT to its children, decrypting and re-encrypting packages by corresponding subgroup keys. However, Iolus has its own drawbacks. Although it is scalable, this schema affects the data path. The GSI may become the bottleneck, because it needs to translate the data by decrypting and encrypting, and relaying it to the next GSI; besides, it also needs to manage the subgroup. Therefore, the delay for the subgroups which are far from the GSC may become substantial. Moreover, the single point failure problem still exists, because the failure in higher level GSI will disconnect all its sublevel groups.
The Intra-domain Group Key Management Protocol (IGKMP) [14] is another possible solution for Inter-BS multicast. In IGKMP, a Domain Key Distributor (DKD) entity is defined for key management, and the domain is divided into a number of administratively-scoped areas, which are administrated by Area Key Distributors (AKD). A domain-wide multicast key-MKey, which corresponds to GTEK in IEEE 802.16, is used to encrypt multicast data. The DKD and AKDs form the All-KD-group, by which the DKD transfers the MKey to each AKD. Each AKD and the group members in its area form the AreaControl-group, through which AKD relays the MKey to its members. With a domain-wide MKey, the AKDs do not need to translate multicast data any more, and all the AKDs are in the same level in the All-KD-group. This mitigates the delay problems that occur in Iolus. However, also due to the usage of domain-wide MKey, the member changes in one Area-Control-group will require the update of the MKey, and affect all other subgroups. This is referred to in [15] as 1-affects-n type problem, which weakens the scalability.
B. Adaptive Inter-BS Multicast Protocol
We have adapted Iolus and IGKMP, and propose Adaptive Inter-BS Multicast Protocol to fit Inter-BS multicast environment. Instead of forming the SDT as in [15] , we divide the group infrastructure into two parts: the backbone and the wireless connections (between BSes and SSes). The group manager and BSes form the top level of multicast group like All-KD-group in [14] , we call it backbone group. Different multicast protocols can be applied within backbone group such as hierarchy key tree. The BSes then multicast the traffic they receive and decrypt from group manager to their subgroup members. By using this hierarchy, communications in backbone and in the wireless network will not be confused and the Intra-BS multicast will not be affected regardless of the backbone multicast schemes. Each Intra-BS multicast can even apply different schemes respectively. Furthermore, the scheme could be optimized, as in [15] , by reencrypting the traffic session key instead of re-encrypting the multicast data directly, which will save the huge amount of encryption/decryption of the traffic. Fig. 4 illustrates our schemes.
In Fig. 4 , the network cloud stands for certain network structures. For example, in the top level, it stands for BS controlled subgroups similar to their siblings. The items below stand for different possible subscribers in the subgroup, such as laptops, PDAs, and even desktops.
Our Inter-BS Multicast Protocol adapts the backbone group, and alleviates the traffic delay due to multiple translations and relays; it also mitigates the single point failure problem in Iolus. On the other hand, because each subgroup has its own GTEK, membership changes in one subgroup will not affect other parts in the group, and guarantees the scalability to large dynamic group. Moreover, because each BS can adapt its own rekeying scheme, this protocol can take advantage of various popular rekeying algorithms according to the member behavior and terrain environment within the BS. We can further adapt Adaptive Rekeying Schema [22] , which assigns different level and number of keys to each group member. This scheme is suitable to BSes which host both fixed and mobile SSes (Mobile Station-MS). Because MSes are more likely to leave the group which will result in rekeying, the BS can group these SSes into one subtree, and allocate a complementary key corresponding to the root of that subtree, which is known by all other subroots but not by itself. When a MS leaves the group, the BS needs to send only one message encrypted by that complementary key to update GTEK to other members within the BS. On the other hand, the BS can also allocate more keys to the members of that subtree, which will reduce the number 
KEK(GK, C 42 ) Figure 6 . Adaptive Rekeying Update Message of messages to update GTEK to the remaining members of that subtree. Moreover, Adaptive Rekeying can also be applied to the backbone group, which may be extended to a hybrid of wireless and wired subgroup headers. That is, there could be both wireless and wired group members within the multicast group. In Fig. 5 , GK is group key associated with the root, i.e., the group controller. K 1 , K 2 , K 3 , and K 4 are logic keys as in LHK associating with sub-roots (we will use the logic keys to denote their associated notes as well), while C 4 is the complementary key associating with sub-root K 4 (known to K 1 , K 2 , K 3 , but not K 4 ). C 4 is assigned here because K 4 is the sub-header that hosts wireless or mobile subscribers. K 41 , K 42 are children of K 4 , and C 41 , C 42 are the corresponding complementary keys. More keys are assigned at this level to facilitate rekeying due to its highly dynamic membership. For example, if a member in sub-tree K 41 leaves, we only need to send the following messages to update the group key to remaining members, as shown in Fig. 6 .
In fact, Fig. 6 only shows rekeying in one BS, and all encrypted keys in the updated messages are new version. Message 3 is sent to the remaining SSes in K 41 , and should be replaced with certain adopted rekeying scheme such as LHK. If extended to backbone group, the leaves will denote sub-headers such as BS instead of SS. By this adaptive rekeying scheme, much fewer messages are needed to update group key while at the cost of only a few additional complementary keys.
C. Some Similar Protocols and Their Weakness
Cluster schemes require the trust on cluster heads (BSes). If the group manager does not want the BSes, which may be manufactured by different vendors, to access the multicast data, it could employ a two-tier key scheme which divides the keys into group control keys (GCK) and subgroup control keys (SGCK 2 ). Only group members have access to the GCK and BSes only distribute SGCKs to handle membership control at subgroup level. This is what [26] defines as semi-trusted systems, which is a derivation from Dual-Encryption Protocol (DEP) [27] .
The Semi-Trusted BS Multicast Protocol (STMP) in [26] works as in Fig. 7 , where SKey is the session key GM generated for each traffic session.
There is some weaknesses in this protocol. In fact, it has critical vulnerabilities. This protocol does not provide backward secrecy and forward secrecy as it claimed. Assuming in one subgroup, the dynamic membership changes as in Fig. 8 . In Fig. 8 , the GCK is updated once, from GCK 1 to GCK 2 . During this period, membership changes twice, therefore SGCK is updated twice accordingly.
For SS 2 , since it has left the group, it should not be allowed access previous data traffic, which is backward secrecy. However, since SS 2 joined the group before GCK 1 is expired, it would be assigned the current GCK, that is, GCK 1 . Now, if SS 2 has intercepted and stored previous messages between GM and its subgroup manager BS, in which the SKey is encrypted by GCK 1 , SS 2 can decrypt it and get the SKey, thus access the data it is not supposed to. On the other hand, after SS 2 leaves the group, the GCK 2 is not expired and will still be used to encrypt the SKey in the first message as in Fig.  7 . Therefore, SS 2 can still intercept and decrypt those messages and access the data traffit, although it is no longer a legal member.
To fix the problems above so as to provide backward and forward secrecy, we suggest to double-encrypt the keying materials in message 1 in SMTP, as in Fig. 9 , where BGTEK is the control (backbone) group TEK. Since SS in each subgroup does not have BGTEK, it can not decrypt the keying materials in message 1 any more.
The revised protocol turns out to be similar to the DualEncryption Protocol, which is shown in Fig. 10 .
Comparing Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 , we can see the difference of the two protocols is that, the revised STMP employs a session key, which is used to encrypt the data traffic, while DEP uses GTEK to encrypt the traffic directly. DEP also has some vulnerabilities. Because it uses GTEK to encrypt the traffic directly, and the GTEK will not update upon member change (which is supposed to be handled by SGTEK), the leaving SS could still access the previous traffic encrypted by that GTEK. Therefore, backward secrecy is not guaranteed. Similarly, the forward secrecy is not guaranteed as well. This is somewhat like the problems in STMP and can be illustated by Fig.  8 also.
The Fully-Trusted BS Multicast Protocol (FTMP) in [26] has similar structure as our proposed Inter-BS Multicast Protocol. It works as shown in 11.
There are also several disadvantages of FTMP when compared with our protocol. First, each BS need to decrypt the traffic it receives from GM, and encrypt it with his SGCK so as to secure multicast the data traffic to the members in his subgroup. This will enforce a huge amount of computation on BS. In our protocol, the BS translates the session key instead of the traffic data, thus saves lots of traffic encryption/decryption, at the expense of only one more key encryption/decryption. Second, FTMP adapts VersaKey centralized key tree scheme [19] in both backbone group and each subgroup. As introduced in Section II, centralized VersaKey tree is in fact an enhancement of LKH, thus also known as LKH+. It has been shown by some researchers that in LKH, there would be no benefit to split the logic key tree into different levels. For FTMP, the structure can be regarded as a big logic key tree which is split into two levels. Thus inherently, FTMP would not have advantages over a simple LKH. In our protocol, adaptive rekeying is adapted. Furthermore, the backbone group and the subgroups could adapt different multicast protocols. Each BS could even decide its own subgroup multicast scheme. Therefore, the features of wired network and wireless network environment can be most explored, and most suitable scheme could be adapted according to the group member's behavior, especially for highly dynamic groups and mobile members. The difference between mesh and infrastructure relay is that a mesh network allows connectivity between any set of end-user devices without manual intervention. From this point, the Flat Key Management protocol in VersaKey Framework [19] should be a good choice for secure multicast in mesh networks. There are three key management solutions in VersaKey: Centralized Tree-Based Key Management (CTK), Centralized Flat Key Management (CFK), and Distributed Flat Key Management (DFK). Instead of maintaining a hierarchical key tree, the Flat scheme assigns the keys in a flat fashion according to the group members' ID (which is usually derived from their network address). This has the advantage of greatly reducing storage requirement. The DFK even relieves the group manager from key distribution, thus best fits the mesh with distributed scheduling in WirelessMAN, while the CFK is suitable for mesh with centralized scheduling where a mesh BS may exist.
The drawback of flat scheme is colluding problems and it is difficult to find and expel collusion members. However, this is also the intrinsic feature of a mesh due to lack of centralized control.
If the mesh network structure is sparse and the traffic for most of the nodes depends on the relaying of other nodes, the Iolus scheme would be the best choice. As discussed in previous subsections, the major drawback of Iolus is, this scheme affects the data path. That is, to relay the keying materials in Iolus, the data is also relayed in the same structure, which is usually not the case. However, in mesh networks, the data need to be relayed any way. Therefore, selecting suitable GSIs according to the topology of the network will take advantages of mesh structure.
VI. EFFICIENT MULTICAST DURING HANDOVER

A. IEEE 802.16 Handover Overview
We have proposed a Secure Handover Protocol in our previous work [8] . In the newly released IEEE 802.16e [2] , several MAC management messages for handover (HO) are defined as follows 3 :
• MOB NBR-ADV: BS that intends to support MS should send this messages at a periodic interval, which identify the network and neighbor BSes to MS that will seek initial network entry or handover.
• MOB BSHO-REQ: BS should send this message to MS if it wants to initiate an HO.
• MOB MSHO-REQ: MS should send this message to BS if it wants to initiate an HO.
• MOB BSHO-RSP: BS should send this message to MS upon reception of MOB MSHO-REQ.
• MOB HO-IND: MS should send this message for final indication that it is ready to perform HO.
In fact, those messages are for hard handover (HHO), which is mandatory in IEEE 802.16e. There are two more optional modes available, provided by WiMAX Forum [28] : Fast BS Switching (FBSS) and Micro Diversity Handover (MDHO). The technical report [29] also introduce these handover procedures for mobile WiMAX, and compare them with some available handover protocols in Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS).
In HHO, both the MS and BS can initiate the handover. If MS initiates HO, it will send MOB MSHO-REQ message to the serving BS (SBS) and the BS replies with MOB BSHO-RSP. If BS initiates HO, it only sends MOB BSHO-REQ message. When the MS decides to begin HO, it will send MOB HO-IND. After that, the connection between MS and SBS is terminated. Then the MS will connect to the target BS (TBS), either by regular procedure, including ranging, authentication, association, etc., or by some fast handover procedures which enable re-authentication with the help of information exchanged between SBS and TBS via backbone. Our proposed protocol in [8] is one possible solution. IEEE 802.16e also provides PKMv2 SA-TEK 3-way handshake to facilitate re-authentication. MOB NBR-ADV is used by SBS to periodically broadcast the information of neighbor BS, by which MS can decide for possible TBS.
In FBSS, both MS and BS maintain an active set of BS (ASBS). In ASBS, an anchor is selected for the MS. The MS only communicate with this anchor BS (ABS). If the MS decide to choose another anchor in current ASBS, no HO procedure is performed. HO only occurs when the selected anchor changes current ASBS, that is, MS decides to communicate to a BS which is outside current ASBS. The possible neighbors outside ASBS forms the monitor set of BS (MSBS).
In FBSS, all data for the MS should be sent to all BSes in ASBS, so as to facilitate the fast BS switching. That is why no explicit HO message is needed if SS switches to a different anchor within ASBS.
In MDHO, the MS needs to communicate with all BSes in ASBS. Therefore, these BSes need to perform selection diversity (with possible help from access router). the MS also need to perform diversity combining, because two or more BSes provide synchronized downlink transmission for it. MDHO begins when a MS decides to transmit or receive messages from multiple BSes in the same time interval.
The detailed procedure during which HO messages are exchanged among MS and BSes will not affect multicast protocols. However, mulitcast protocol during handover can take advantage of certain type of HO, which will be explored shortly.
B. Delayed Feedback Rekeying Algorithm
IEEE 802.16e adds mobility to WirelessMAN, thus secure and efficient handover becomes critical for mobile WiMAX. Besides the ordinary join/leave of group members, the mobile members' exiting/entering will cause many additional rekeys. That is because, when the handover member exits from the SBS cell and enters the TBS cell, both SBS and TBS need to update their subgroup TEK (SGTEK) due to the intra-BS subgroup member changes. The range of BS is up to 15km, and the mobile speed support is up to 150km/h. That means, even if the vehicle travels from exactly one end of the SBS cell to the other end via the diameter, it could take as little as 6 minutes or so. Besides, the BS can not cover such long range due to the deployment issues such as power and terrains, and some overlap should be provided to ensure smooth handover while cars on highway usually run faster than 120km/h. Therefore, handover will take place very often for high-speed vehicles, causing many unnecessary group rekeys. The rekeys are not necessary because the MS is still in the group and should be allowed to access the multicast session, which usually lasts at least half an hour such as TV plays, video conference, etc. In fact, the minimum lifetime of TEK is 30 minutes.
We proposed a Delayed Feedback Rekeying Algorithm (DFRA) for MBS during handover to solve this problem. When the MS begins handover and exits the SBS, the SBS will not update the SGTEK immediately, because the MS is still in the top-level multicast group and is allowed to access the multicast traffic, thus the forward secrecy is not a concern at this time. Nevertheless, the SBS needs to make a record for this MS (in its past handover subgroup member list-PHSML). After the MS enters the TBS, however, the TBS needs to update its SGTEK in order to provide backward secrecy. That is because, the TBS does not know when the MS joins the multicast group and from which point it is allowed to access the multicast traffic (unless its first SBS makes a record for this and pass it to later TBSes). Fortunately, this will not cause much trouble, because it is easy for rekeying upon a member joining. The TBS only needs to notify its current subgroup members through broadcast connection to update the subgroup key by one greater index using certain one-way hash function, meanwhile sends this updated key to MS by unicast (through its Primary Management Connection encrypted by KEK). Also, the TBS needs to maintain a current handover subgroup member list (CHSML), to record the SBS from which the MS left. If the MS leaves the multicast group due to certain reasons, the TBS needs to perform subgroup key update upon member leave using certain Intra-BS multicast protocol. Meanwhile, the TBS needs to notify the MS's previous SBS according to its entry in local CHSML, in order to make sure this MS can not access the multicast traffic from that SBS either. If the SBS has already updated its subgroup key due to a member leaving, it will reset the entries for those MSes in PHSML. Therefore, the SBS does not need to perform key update, because the MS is not in the list anymore and is not able to access current subgroup multicast traffic due to the key updated already. Otherwise, the SBS should perform subgroup key update upon member leave to ensure backward secrecy. Anyhow, SBS should notify the MS's previous SBS according to its CHSML as what Figure 12 . Delayed Feedback Rekeying Algorithm the TBS did to it, and so on, to ensure all the BSes which have ever served this MS expel it from accessing multicast traffic.
DFRA could obviate most of the rekeys due to member handover, while still keeps backward and forward secrecy for the multicast group. Moreover, it also solves the ping-pong problem caused by members hovering among adjacent BSes.
C. Group Manager Controlled Rekeying Algorithm DFRA described in the former section needs the cooperation only among the member SS and its SBS and TBSes. If the group manager gets involved during handover, more efficiency may be achieved.
First, the group manager, or the AAA server (Authentication, Authorization and Accounting), should have a record for each group member about its status in the group, such as when this SS joined the group and how long it is entitled to get the multicast service. When the SS first associates to a BS in the multicast group, the BS should get such information from AAA server. During the handover, the SBS shall pass that information to TBS. If the SS' log in time is before the TBS' subgroup last rekeying, which means this SS is entitled to all the multicast service during TBS' current key lifetime, the TBS does not need to force rekeying upon a member joining.
Second, when the SS leaves the multicast group, its current serving BS should notify the group manager, instead of notifying MS's previous SBSes recursively. In this case, the group manager should broadcast or multicast the leaving notification of the SS in the backbone group, to ensure every BS in the control group aware of the leaving MS. If this MS is still in the PHSML of a BS, the BS needs to perform rekeying upon the member leaving. Comparing to the basic DFRA, the enhanced group manager controlled rekeying algorithm (GMCRA) avoids recursive member leaving notification through the TBS-SBS chain, while only enforces one multicast notification in the control group (if the proposed Adaptive Inter-BS multicast scheme in section IV-B is adopted). There are two possible ways to multicast the notification. As above, the current serving BS sends notification to the group manager, then group manager multicasts it through the control group. As an alternative way,, the current serving BS could multicast the notification directly to the control group if it is entitled to.
The Group Manager Controlled Rekeying Algorithm (GMCRA) scheme is shown in Fig 13 . Since traffic data for the MS have been sent to all BSes in ASBS, there is no problem for the new ABS to relay those traffic to MS. However, in many situations, encryption is needed over the traffic data. There is no specification on the keys shared among MS and the BSes in ASBS. It could be assumed that MS shall share different AKs (and TEKs) with different BSes. Otherwise, the ASBS will form a multicast group itself and rekeying will be necessary every time member in ASBS changes.
Therefore, if a MS join a multicast group, it will need to join all the subgroups controlled by the BSes in ASBS, thus facilitate to anchor change within ASBS. No rekeying is necessary in this situation. However, if MS starts HO, that is, it wants to join a BS outside current ASBS, rekeying upon member join needs to be performed in the new anchor BS's subgroup. If the MS leaves the multicast group, rekeying upon member leave needs to be performed in all BSes that ever appear in his ASBS.
In MDHO, sharing different keys with BSes will make a little trouble for combining diversity on BS side and diversity selection on MS side. This could be handled by modified algorithms implemented on rake receiver, which is outside the scope of this paper. Besides that, there would be not much difference between the mulitcast for FBSS and MDHO. The MS will listen to the multicast channels of all the BSes in ASBS. If the ASBS changes, MS will join the subgroup controlled by the new members in ASBS. Rekeying upon a member leaving will take place at all BSes that ever appear in ASBS only if MS leaves the multicast group. If we still want to use the original MDHO scheme, then the Adaptive Inter-BS multicast protocol should not be adopted any more. In fact, any algorithm which uses different subgroup keys among BSes is not suitable. In this case, IGKMP could be considered.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper discusses the MBRA in IEEE 802. 16 and modifies it as a more efficient algorithm for secure multicast in Intra-BS. MBRA does not provide backward and backward secrecy, it is not scalable to large dynamic group either. Some ambiguities in the original starndard are also discussed. Our modified versions address these issues and provide better performance in all possible cases implied in the standard. We also apply different protocols to Intra-BS and mesh network.
We propose an Adaptive Inter-BS Multicast Protocol, which takes advantages of several popular efficient and secure multicast protocols. It not only guarantees backward and forward secrecy, but also alleviates the drawbacks of those popular protocols such as delay of traffic and lack of scalability. It is also adaptive to member behavior, thus suitable for BS whose service is for both fixed and mobile SSes. Furthermore, it can be extended to hybrid network with both wired and wireless subscribers in the same multicast group.
Finally, we propose DFRA for efficient and secure multicast during handover operations. For mobile networks that support high speed vechicles, as what IEEE 802.16e aims to, handover may take place frequently. This will cause huge amount of rekeying for secure multicast service. FDRA delays the rekeying caused by handover untill the mobile member leaves the top level of multicast group, thus avoids lots of unnecessary rekeying. If group manager gets involved during handover, a more efficient GMCR algorithm can be adopted. Secure Multicast for Optional Handover Procedures namely FBSS and MDHO are also discussed.
